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Terminology: I take the term ‘probative’ from jurisprudence, where it means ‘having the 
quality or function of proving or demonstrating’ a conclusion,2 presumably by contrast 
with ‘supporting, suggesting, or indicating’ a conclusion, and I use the term with that 
meaning, except that I use it by contrast with two other established processes for doing 
the same task, notably deduction, and induction in a special sense of the latter. The spe-
cial sense is intended to preclude using ‘inductive’ to cover all non-deductive reasoning, 
and refers to the type of induction for which we have some kind of logical analysis, 
namely statistical inference from samples to population3. I make no claim about the rela-
tion of ‘probative’ to several other terms that have been coined to refer to legitimate in-
ference types other than deduction, which usually include some kinds of induction. These 
include logics called defeasible, non-monotonic4, default, autoepistemic5, paraconsistent 
and relevance (hope springs eternal!): reasoning called plausible, prima facie, presump-
tive, analogical (as John Wisdon suggested), conductive (Wellman’s term, this and the 
previous one being just two of Blair’s many suggestions for inclusion here), and of course 
Toulmin’s rebuttable, Perelman’s argumentative, and Peirce’s abductive reasoning; since 
I find it hard to get a clear and generally acceptable definition of these terms, or, with the 
neologisms, to find them getting any substantial traction on the ground of real arguments. 
all coined from the same sense of a need to identify a cate-
 
1 For acknowledgments, see endnote. 
2 New Oxford American Dictionary. Merriam-Webster has this as sense 2; sense 1 is “exploratory,” which I 
think  is a rare use and would regard as a connotation of probative in my sense. 
3 The inference from the cards in poker player X’s hand when there is still one card to be dealt, to the con-
clusion that it has a 93% chance of being the best hand dealt is inductive in my sense; if we assume the 
pack is well-shuffled and fairly dealt, it’s deductive; the inference from this and an expert player’s predic-
tion, knowing all the players well, that s/he’ll win the hand is probative in my sense. 
4 In his major contribution to this literature, John Pollock takes ‘defeasible’ to mean ‘non-monotonic’ i.e., 
such that the addition of a premise can lead to the failure of the argument to establish the conclusion, with-
out contradicting any other premise (“Defeasible Reasoning” in Reasoning, (J. Adler and L. Rips, eds., 
Cambridge, 2008), p. 453. But he includes perception, which I categorically distinguish from inference; and 
does not consider inferences from analogies, rough estimates, and approximations, i.e., those by most ex-
perts in practice, and by most scientists using most of the ‘laws’ in physics, astronomy, and the forensic 
sciences, which I regard as important types of probative inference. 
5 Default and autoepistemic logics are referenced by Hank Kyburg in Reasoning, op. cit., p. 293. 
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gory of legitimate inference other than the classic duo. Like many of them, I think there is 
still room to do more in the way of providing an informal structure in terms of which the 
homeless family of concepts like prima facie, ceteris paribus, presumptive, enthymemes, 
burden of proof, ostensive definitions, etc., can find spatial shelter.  
Within the category of probative inference I distinguish two sub-types: logical 
(i.e., based on meaning rules) and empirical (based on factual (meaning non-evaluative) 
evidence and empirical generalizations). An example of the first would be the taxonomic 
(sortal?) inference from the presence of a number of the most important criteria for the 
identification of, say, an apple, and the conclusion that it is an apple. I refer to these cases 
as criterial inference. An example of the second type would be the inference from the 
data available in 1990 to the conclusion that heavy smoking often causes lung cancer. 
There are plenty of intermediate cases where for example: (i) some of the facts appealed 
to are not criteria but only indicators (i.e., empirically but not logically correlated with 
applehood); or (ii) the general premise is arguably but not indisputably meaning based, 
e.g., cases using the laws of motion, and laws about ideal types such as ideal gases or ide-
ally elastic bodies or ideal markets. And there are plenty of cases where the inference in-
volves both types of (stated or implicit) premise. 
Given that many of the nouns for things in common or widespread scientific use 
are now cluster concepts—that is, defined in terms of an indeterminate number of differ-
entially weighted criteria6 rather than a synonymous phrase—however neatly defined 
they may have been when introduced; and given the preponderance of cases of empirical 
inference which are neither deductions from true generalizations nor statistical inferences 
from samples, it seems plausible to conclude that much, perhaps even most, of our com-
monplace inferences, in everyday life and in science, are probative inferences.7 It there-
fore seems plausible to argue, as my first suggestion, that our texts should spend more 
time on the explication of probative inference. I here try to add a few paragraphs aimed in 
that direction. 
The ‘criterioncluster concept’ inference provides a weak kind of illustration of 
the main type of logical probative inference. What can we say about its empirical cousin? 
We might begin by asking if there is anything in common to the logical form of each. It 
appears that both are engaged in a species of pattern-recognition. The first is seeking a 
pattern within the repertoire of existing concepts: the second seeks a pattern within the 
repertoire of existing explanation-types. Now, I realize that talking about patterns is 
pretty sloppy stuff compared with the simple charms of the neo-positivist deductive 
model of explanation, even though that had to be loosened up into the inductive model 
with its embarrassing ‘requirement of total evidence.’ My only excuse is that I cannot 
think of anything more exact that is correct. Let me expand a little on what I think we can 
ugar-coating to get you to swallow the pill. I’m going to do 
tions in a minute, and let me preface that by saying that I 
say, and see if that’s enough s
some talking about brain func
                                                        
6  Criteria are here taken to be the general properties that are typically provided in explaining the meaning 
of a term. These include necessary conditions, although they are comparatively rare with common con-
cepts, in science or life; and exclude particular descriptions (literal ostensive definitions) and of course real 
ostensive definitions. 
7  I have been chasing the clarification of criteria for some time (see for example, “The logic of criteria” in 
Journal of Philosophy (1959, pp. 857-868), and that of scientific probative inference even longer (Explana-
tions… (D. Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1956, (UMI Microform) for the concept of ‘selection-explanations,’ a pos-
sible precursor of ‘inference to the best explanation.’)  
 2
PROBATIVE INFERENCE 
  3
space that is at a much greate
vastly greater. Patterns in long
                                                       
find almost everything that is advertised as an insight into human behaviour obtained 
from neurology to be a charade of confusing correlation and causation. But I’m going to 
propose what I think is one of the exceptions. Cognitive neuroscience is not just a new 
jargon, though what I have to offer did not come from research done there.8 
First, the heuristic here—it would be a gross exaggeration to call it an algo-
rithm—is what I’m going to call the General Elimination Method, mainly because it has a 
memorizable acronym.9 The brain, whether it is managing a tacit process as in perception 
(you see that X is an apple) or supporting you while you work through an explicit infer-
ence (“White rump, short tail, pointy wings, swooping low: X must be a violet-crowned 
swallow”), is primarily an instrument developed to help its owner survive.10 Given its 
very limited storage capacity, relative to the flood of raw data surging down the sensory 
channels when you’re awake,11 survival means fitting the stream of input into the avail-
able storage in such a way that it can be recovered when needed. The storage consists of a 
very large number of templates (a.k.a. patterns), in both the short-term and the long-term 
memory, plus a dating system and a cross-indexed filing system (using, as far as one can 
tell, metadata as relevance codes and a set of search heuristics). The templates are loosely 
grouped in the memory banks by knowledge management tasks and also arranged in a 
hierarchy of urgency that keeps the ones required for disaster avoidance, e.g., in traffic, 
family emergencies, or job interviews, near the top of the pile (metaphorically speaking).  
The degree of compression here is impressive. Take the simplest way in which the brain 
compresses information—by using repetition indicators in short-term memory. If storing 
a 3D picture of this room in its entirety takes about 50Mb of information in a moderately 
high resolution hologram, storing the information that it has remained unchanged in most 
respects takes only 5 bits, and even if we note some small changes that have occurred and 
the duration of the basic sameness, we manage a reduction ratio of 1000 to 1. By using 
the short-term memory in this way, we can store very detailed patterns since we trash 
them, more or less completely, as we move to new surroundings and circumstances. The 
patterns that graduate to the big time circuit, i.e., the long-term memory, take up storage 
r premium and much harder to reuse, but its payoff is also 
-term memory are linked to gatekeeper pattern recognition 
 
8 Some time ago, I provided an attempt to apply this kind of analysis to all the key concepts in the philoso-
phy of science (“The psycho-logical foundations of modern science.” The New Metaphysical Foundations 
of Modern Science, 1994. Noetic Sciences Institute, pp. 47–79.) 
9 I’m following the general geek’ principle of good practice’ here, which seems to be: If you can’t find an 
algorithm, invent an acronym. 
10 Tony Blair, in his comments, rightly asked me to explain more clearly what I am saying about arguments 
by contrast with inferences, and this sentence is one of several in which I indicate my wish to support the 
view that the domain of inference (including probative inference) is vastly greater than that of argu-
ments/reasoning and that logic should cover both without confusing them. The question “What made you 
think that?” so common in dialectic, covers both, and pushes for disclosure of cues as well as reasons, so 
that logic (the referee) can bring the rules to bear (e.g., locating the burden of proof and requiring a real 
proof. I’m just pushing to make sure ‘real proof ‘can include sound probative inference and its explicit for-
mulation, including, for example, ceteris paribus clauses, but not an unlimited license to use them. A slogan 
for this effort might be ‘Enthymeme, thy goal is deductive, but thy soul is probative.” 
11  I’ve seen estimates that the brain might be only able to store three days’ worth of sensory information if 
it had to store it all without shortcuts like the use of patterns. There is also a need to store internally gener-
ated information from e.g., reflection, inference, and speculation. Even if this is off by an order of magni-
tude or two, it remains clear that a categorical imperative of survival is brutal data compression in the nerv-
ous system. 
MICHAEL SCRIVEN 
routines in the sensory receptors and the front end processors of the main brain, and what 
they do is to cut a swathe through all future input in other words eliminating a potentially 
infinite amount of data that would otherwise have to be either stored or considered for 
storage. The pattern recognition process identifies new data that matches the pattern 
(roughly is good enough) as redundant since already stored, hence can be ignored. This is 
the great strength of even roughly correct patterns, and this is why the human skills at 
configural recognition are so highly developed, immensely more sensitive and accurate 
than the simple verbal forms we can express in our languages, even when they are en-
hanced by technical vocabularies. We recognize our friends and families although we are 
incapable of giving a description of them that would enable another to pick them out in a 
crowd. 
So the storage of a pattern in the way gases behave, e.g., the general gas law, even 
though it’s a very rough approximation to the truth, is all that we need for vast stretches 
of action scenarios, and takes up a million times less space than the raw data from a mil-
lion more observations. The simplicity and accuracy of the patterns that the neo-
positivists thought characterized natural laws adds a minor multiplier; rough generaliza-
tions are the icebreakers, exact laws mere ice cube makers, generating tidy tidbits of the 
good stuff.12 Of course, such nice—although almost non-existent—laws also made de-
duction (or induction) of the explanandum possible, but by loosening that connection to 
that of probative inference from rough generalizations, we get an extremely effective re-
sult, with the advantage of not requiring false premises, viz., precise universal generaliza-
tions. 
For our purposes here, which is constructing a block or two of the foundations of 
CT/IL, the main knowledge management tasks are things like: (i) finding the right name 
for some entity X that you’re looking at, e.g., in order to communicate to someone about 
it, or to see if it’s on your shopping list (in writing or memory), or on your list of dangers 
to run from or scream about; (ii) finding the right metaphor to use in explaining X to a 
particular listener; (iii) finding the right explanation of X in a scientific context; (iv) find-
ing the right cause of X, in a fast practical search, for example of why your car has 
stopped running in the middle of a freeway; (v) finding the right rhyme for X in a poem 
you’re writing; (vi) finding the right counter-example to an alleged generalization or 
definition, etc.  
All these finding activities presuppose a stock of patterns in which to search, al-
beit a stock with an open texture, meaning that we can add to it by creative combinations 
or cross-references. Given that we have such a stock, the finding activity is a pattern-
recognition one, usually handicapped by the limitations of language. Much of critical 
thinking is devoted to trying to express the considerations that underlie a clear feeling 
that an argument is invalid, a definition incorrect, or a generalization overreaching. This 
is the task of converting tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge, and we do it in the inter-
est of validation, because we know that what seems like tacit knowledge can be inter-
is sometimes false intuition.  judge inconsistent, and hence 
                                                        
12  When I first proposed this thesis (in “The Key Property of Physical Laws—Inaccuracy” in Philosophical 
Studies c. 1955, reprinted in Feigl & Maxwell (eds., 1961) Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science. 
New York: Holt, pp. 91–101), I was treated as someone who should be treated kindly, as one treats those 
having a slight mental disorder, by my good friends amongst the neo-positivists, e.g., Herbert Feigl and 
Peter Hempel. After all, everyone knew that laws of nature could not be inaccurate. 
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Probative inference fits into this account as, at times, a kind of promissory note 
for an inference that seems beyond reasonable doubt (BRD), although not meeting the 
standards of explicit deduction or induction. The expert birdwatcher identifying the vio-
let-green swallow knows BRD that the identification is correct in an instant. When chal-
lenged for reasons, s/he reconstructs the criteria that influenced the call from memory. 
But there are times when BRD is present and the language can’t carry the load, even for 
Gregory House; every birdwatcher and diagnostician knows of many such cases in their 
own experience, and every case of face processing by the man in the street also quali-
fies.13 And, at the other end of the spectrum, there is the smoking/lung cancer kind of 
case, where all the cards are on the table, in words, and the case can be made bulletproof, 
given considerable time. Deduction and induction are of course the latter kind of case; 
probative inference has the middle ground, often but not always verbally reconstructable. 
In terms of symbolic representation of probative inference, it’s sometimes acceptable to 
portray them in the usual way. In the case of criterial inference this would be: 
 
This case has the properties C1, C2, C3,…. (where C are some of the criteria for 
X)  
This is an X 
 
(Sometimes the C’s would be cases, and the conclusion would be that X was the cause of 
the phenomena described in the cases; and there are other cases of probative inference.) 
But it’s sometimes desirable to be able to indicate that the inference is intended to be sim-
ply probative, so I propose that we indicate the special nature of a probative inference by 
using a double line under the premises. Then the above would be replaced by: 
 
This case has the properties C1, C2, C3,…. (where C are some of the criteria for 
X) 
This is an X 
 
and in horizontal format would be represented as: C1, C2,…—>>  X. 
If the list of C’s includes all the criteria for X, in the cases where they are all 
known, and known to be all, this would of course be a deduction.  
In general, probative inferences can be challenged in the same way as claimed de-
ductions, definitions, or generalizations, by citing counter-examples. For example, some-
one might say of the violet-green swallow case: “But there are two eagles that have those 
characteristics!” to which the response might be of the usual reformulation species: “Oh, 
well of course I’m taking overall size, and geographic/topographic location, and time of 
year into account as well.” 
So the suggestion here is that pattern recognition—claimed, challenged, refined—
is the underlying process in much probative inference, whether of the taxonomic or 
causal or other sub-species. A corollary of this view is unwelcome to those of us with lin-
li: the criteria of merit for probative inferences are mainly gering dreams of logical calcu
                                                        
13  Though we are usually over the line between perception and inference with face recognition, we still can 
sometimes reconstruct the perceptual process, and a related point can be made for what we might call pro-
bative perception, i.e., conclusions can be achieved BRD without the help of inductive/deductive inference. 
(John Pollock’s examples begin with cases of perception, not inference.) 
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the extent of the match between two patterns—the one we see now, and the template in 
memory with attached evidence of validity. We do have pretty good pattern-matching 
computer programs now, not just for fingerprints but for voices and faces; but the catch is 
that they are only rarely intelligible to humans when converted to common language. Lo-
gicians are even less fond than mathematicians of the idea that the validity of arguments 
is best left to the machines to judge; but that may be the best we can do in many cases. In 
others, the computers will point us to something that ‘makes sense’ at the level of the or-
dinary language of argumentation. One problem is that it’s clear that training clearly im-
proves the ability to identify good  probative inferences, which lends too much credence 
to the idea that wine experts and art experts exist whose judgment of merit is any better 
than the lay person’s, when in fact there are no grounds for thinking this at all. Of course, 
their judgments of authenticity (in art) or origin (in oenology) is testable but there’s no 
way to bridge from such objective characteristics to merit—in  these cases. In others, e.g., 
judging the merit of a redwood tree for cutting building lumber, merit is indeed a matter 
where skilled judgment is possible and provable. 
I’d now like to consider a special variety of taxonomic probative inference—those 
with an evaluative conclusion. For example, in grading a student’s answer to a short-
essay question, we might reason from the presence of: (i) an original approach, (ii) that is 
clearly stated, and (iii) well argued, (iv) covering all that was asked, to the conclusion 
that it deserves an A grade in this context. Or that a Pilot G2 rollerball pen is an excellent 
model of that kind of writing instrument because of (i) its impeccably smooth delivery of 
(ii) an unbroken line of (iii) more than a mile’s length per cartridge, (iv) even when the 
writing angle is as high as 30º, using a (v) highly stable ink, (vi) with excellent mono-
chromatic hue, at (vii) the same price as other available choices; to the conclusion that it 
is a good balllpen.  
Superficial inspection makes it clear that these are not deductions—other consid-
erations about the alternatives need to be in place, and may be considered part of the ob-
vious context hence omitted from the explicit consideration. In other words, a typical 
probative inference is useful just because it avoids getting into the almost endless quest 
for deductively adequate premises—or even into inductively high-probability premises—
or the empty of alternative of turning it into a tautology by  making it into a claim about 
an ideal entity. Instead, one can focus on the factors that account for all the variability, 
i.e., the significant relevant considerations, and settle for probative inference. We leave 
out reference to the context of the evaluative or taxonomic discussion, although it pro-
vides us with the tacit standards for merit or identification (the locale, season, and general 
size in the swallow case) because they are part of the common fixed background for par-
ticipants in the communication, hence it’s redundant to include them in the normal con-
text of discussion. Incorporating this omission is part of the difference between the re-
quirements on tools for practical reasoning and those for mathematical proof, e.g., be-
tween deduction and probative inference. 
Note that we still critique these probative arguments by counter-exampling within 
that context. For example, the essay-grading illustration is clearly flawed by its failure to 
exclude plagiarism, currently a serious consideration if computers are allowed in exams 
where wi-fi is available, as it is on most college and many school campuses; and the rol-
lerball example is flawed by the failure to cover leaking when carried, especially in hot 
weather or on planes, although those counter-examples stray close to non-standard con-
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texts. 
A point of particular interest about these evaluative examples of probative infer-
ence is that the criteria set for ‘good X’ or ‘A-grade X’ etc., are not derived in any simple 
way from the criteria for X. You need to know something about Xs and how they differ 
in ways that matter to users or those affected by the use of these things, in order to know 
how to tell good and bad ones apart. In other words, to define ‘good apple,’ just as to de-
fine ‘apple’ in the real world, you need to know a good deal about the criteria for each of 
them, and you can’t get the first set from the second set. The dictionary is a useful tool, 
but like a pocket knife, it’s not the full toolkit for a woodworker; and our knowledge of 
our native tongue covers the full toolkit, to use which requires that we know very well 
that a blade won’t do the work of chisels and gouges.  
In the version of this paper for publication I hope to include some real cases in de-
tail from the first version of this paper, one of which provides the criteria for identifying a 
good ‘chef’s knife.’ If you ask someone to explain to you exactly what a chef’s knife is 
they can do this by talking about blade length, function, handle, and so on; but that won’t 
tell you much about what makes a good chef’s knife. Only someone with some knowl-
edge of cutlery technology can do that, a group that mainly includes chefs who are inter-
ested in their tools as well as in cooking, kitchen equipment geeks, knife collectors, and 
the best knife designers, plus a few commercial kitchen equipment sales staff, though 
most of the latter group will not get it right.  
Note that I am not talking about the highly debatable issues such as those sur-
rounding a question like, Who makes the best chef’s knife (or even, Is the Shun better 
than the Wusthof Icon), or Must a good chef’s knife be made of steel; or of stainless 
steel; or can it be stellite, or ceramic? I’m just talking about what the dimensions of merit 
are, the criteria or properties on which performance has to be good in order that the entity 
qualify as a good chef’s knife—and some crude idea of their relative weights, e.g., on a 
4-way scale of Essential, Important, Marginally Important, Irrelevant. And some very 
crude idea of what minimum standards of performance are required for merit on those 
dimensions, e.g., that a chef’s knife should hold its edge, perhaps with the help of a steel 
but not a sharpener, for at least one day of normal use by a chef. People don’t think seri-
ously about such matters unless they have an unusual vocational concern or other motiva-
tion such as collecting.  
Even though all of us have eaten grapes for many years, and probably bought 
them most of that time, our knowledge of what counts as a good grape for eating is 
mostly tacit—but recoverable. There are at least a dozen criteria of merit for good table 
grapes, though you’d have trouble listing these if asked for them. But I could elicit these 
from you quite easily, the Socratic legerdemain, if I put a carefully selected dozen sam-
ples of bad grapes in front of you and asked you to say why each of them was unaccept-
able. So you know what makes a good table grape, though you probably don’t know how 
to state what you know without cueing. In Ryle’s terms, quoted with approval by Polanyi, 
you know how to identify them, but not what it is that distinguishes them. You have the 
pattern of merit in your head, but not the formula. So you are in a position to say with 
confidence: “Those grapes look very good” but it’s a perception, not an inference. You 
might say the same about a knife in an illustrated catalogue, or even one with just the 
specifications. 
The cutlery expert, on the other hand, will look at the actual knife rather carefully, 
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test a few things about the knife, use a loupe to look at the grind on the edge, and can 
make a probative inference to the conclusion that it’s really a good chef’s knife. The 
premises of that inference are the facts about the knife, and the conclusion is about its 
merit, so it’s an inference from empirical premises to an evaluative conclusion. The infer-
ence license is the presence of enough items from the list of criteria of merit to establish 
merit probatively, and since that list is what defines merit, it doesn’t count as an extra 
premise. My take on Searle’s example of the same species (promising behaviour implies 
obligation) would be that his premises turn out to require a string of conditions that would 
be hard to completely specify, just like the list of defining criteria in examples I’ve used 
here, and hence that the inference is in fact probative, although he claims it is deductive. 
As Tony Blair pointed out to me, he uses the language of prima facie and defeaters, so he 
might be receptive to this modification of his view.14 
What about the classical objections to such inferences? On my view, Hume was 
right—you can't (strictly speaking) deduce evaluative conclusions from non-evaluative 
premises; but he was wrong in thinking that this means you can’t validly infer them, i.e., 
probatively, which is all that should matter in any realistic logic. (That is, I won’t con-
cede the territory of validity to deduction, any more than the Oxford dictionaries do.) And 
Moore was right that any classic definition of ‘good’ (i.e., one offering a short synony-
mous translation) is questionable; since (i) ‘good’ can’t be classically defined out of con-
text, it can only have its meaning explained in the metalanguage (in terms of its modifier 
function in the process of evaluation): but (ii) “good X” can be criterially ‘defined’ in 
context (although ”explained” is a better term), but that kind of definition is not threat-
ened by the Moorean question, because it already concedes the (so-called ‘logical’) pos-
sibility of incompleteness by ending with an ellipsis. So Moore was wrong in thinking 
that his question refutes naturalistic approaches to ethics. 
Hence, if we abandon the notion that classical definitions are the paradigm for ex-
plaining meaning, we can make informal logic a much better account of critical thinking 
in general, and evaluative reasoning in particular—and remove some alleged logical ob-
stacles to naturalistic ethics. And, not so incidentally, do a better job of teaching critical 
thinking, i.e., one that will be more useful, especially because applicable in a wider range 
of contexts. 
Finally, back to the pattern recognition theme for a wrap-up. Just as (i) identifying 
an X is a pattern recognition task, hinted at but not exhaustively analyzed by a criterial 
definition, so too is (ii) explaining X, or (iii) finding the cause of X, or (iv) classifying X, 
or (v) finding a way to program the task X, or (vi) fix the engine failure X, etc. Of course, 
success in these tasks requires not only the great pattern recognition skills your brain pro-
vides, it also requires a great repertoire of patterns to search, a task that early education 
and liberal arts education contribute to as well as specialized education e.g., a knowledge 
of the many ways a constant velocity joint can be constructed, and experience (e.g., in 
distinguishing the sounds of various mechanical flaws in operational but defective en-
gines). There are ways to improve education in that direction, but our task here is just to 
focus on probative inference as the mechanism for pattern recognition. In that direction, 
at this part of the process is driven by the General Elimina-the suggestion made here is th
                                                        
14 As a footnote to an old issue, perhaps one might say that Searles’ argument is contextually deductive in 
what I take to be Sherlock Holmes’ sense of ‘deductive,’ where there is some reference to ‘this situation’ in 
the required premises. 
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ing to 2 above—the list of all 
                                                       
tion Method. The details of this vary amongst the six examples given, but let’s take the 
hunt for causes as a typical case. 
The GEM approach here requires the following premises:  
 
1. Every event of the present type (X) has a cause (or causes). (True for almost 
all macro events.) 
2. A putatively exhaustive list of the possible causes of an event of type X in-
cludes: C1, C2, …Cn 
3. Each Ci in this list brings about X via a chain of intervening causes, Ci1, Ci2, 
… These are referred to as the modus operandi of the cause Ci. (There may be 
cases of direct action where Cij is zero.) 
4. The facts of the case show that only Cp and Cq of the Ci were present prior to 
the occurrence of X. 
5. The facts also show that the modus operandi of Cp but not Cq were all  pre-
sent. 
Hence, we can infer that Cp was the cause of X on this occasion. 
 
This inference will be probative, with a degree of certainty that depends on that of the 
premises, and that level often exceeds all reasonable doubt. Whole sciences such as epi-
demiology, forensic medicine, criminalistics, and geology, are built on using GEM, and 
they are notably short on predictions, long on explanations. Support for probative infer-
ences, when attacked, can come (at least) from explicating tacit knowledge (e.g., by ex-
panding the lists of causes or MOs) or from holistic/gestalt arguments using metaphors or 
analogies to the pattern of the inference, or from appealing to (possibly rough) generali-
zations. This is (one aspect of) how the process of pattern recognition interfaces with ex-
plicit logic. Note that in some of these cases we will be dealing with approximations and 
other types of vagueness, and these cases need further discussion.15 
I think we may need to create a new category, half way between tacit knowledge, 
which Polanyi defines as incapable of conversion to explicit knowledge, and the latter. 
We could call it latent or implicit inference. This will give us three types of probative in-
ference, according to the degree of explicitness of the premises: (i) fully explicit—the 
smoking and lung cancer case; (ii) convertible by interrogation or challenge—the orni-
thologist case and many forensic cases e.g., the radiologist; (iii) the immutably tacit case, 
where the inferrer can’t identify the cues but is confident of the inference and has solid 
evidence of past successes or concurrent corroboration to support it. The third case is still 
not perception, because there is no recognition involved and the inferrer states or agrees 
that an inference is being made. (Of course, s/he may say “It looks to me like a case 
where there’s a real risk of suicide and we should put this patient on 24-hour watch” but 
that’s a metaphorical use of ‘looks.’) 
There are also large areas of applied science, e.g., policy analysis, city planning, 
internal medicine, that use a version of GEM to generate predictions. Here, premise 1’ is: 
every intervention has an effect (or effects). The completeness of the premise correspond-
possible effects, 2,’—is often shakier and hence the proba-
 
15 Elia Zardini from the University of Edinburgh has been working on inexact knowledge and what he calls 
‘tolerant logics’ that restrict transitivity of implication but permit a proof of consistency for the logic, in 
what looks like a promising start. (The Reasoner 4/09, p. 6) 
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tive inference to a prediction is made with less confidence. However, in this analogous 
process—it might be called the management or control version of GEM—we can still en-
sure at least some improvement of the probabilities of a desired outcome. We do this by 
the elimination of entries in the 2’ list, not by inspection but by interventions that prevent 
the less desirable outcomes, in order to achieve (rather than reactively infer) the desired 
outcome.16 
I hope that the GEM approach can thus be seen as a key process in the validation 
of one important family of probative inferences that is common in both empirical scien-
tific work and in the many branches of evaluation (e.g., program evaluation and policy 
analysis) in science, engineering, technology, the humanities, and jurisprudence, and 
management or government. I am of course only calling attention to it, not inventing it, 
and labelling it in order to make the attention easier, and also perhaps to increase the ease 
of remembering the above modest (and tentative) clarification of it. 
In conclusion, I hope that these rough ideas will encourage suggestions for im-
provement, and even perhaps some increased attention to the concept and use of proba-
tive inference in texts on both critical thinking and informal logic. 
 
NOTE: This paper, given at OSSA in June, 2009, is the fourth version of a paper with 
this title, first circulated in late 2008, and has been much improved by comments on the 
first version by Tony Blair, Bob Ennis, and Mary Anne Warren; and on the second by 
those who commented on it at the Pacific APA meetings in April, 2009 (many thanks to 
Wanda Teays for facilitating that presentation). I’m especially indebted to Tony, whose 
detailed references to the existing literature were very helpful and are frequently used in 
this version. The third  version, containing by then I think not one sentence from the first, 
went to John Woods for his comments at OSSA, June, 2009, in the light of which I am 
hopeful it will be worth developing a fifth version. I have (I think) improved it since 
sending the third version to John, by adding several hundred words, but will try to make 
clear where this has happened when presenting it. The predecessor of these efforts was an 
invited paper, “Probative Logic,” at the 1st International Conference on Argumentation in 
Amsterdam, in 1986, that I think was published in its Proceedings. (I haven’t looked at 
that since giving it, so this one may contradict it.) My continuing interest in the topic 
comes partly from an urge to get informal logic to portray ordinary reasoning more accu-
rately, and partly from an effort to get the logic of the new discipline of evaluation clari-
fied. 
 
         Link to commentary 
 
16 There’s an interesting hybrid case in formative evaluation i.e., evaluation for improvement. Here the 
evaluator identifies weaknesses, and concludes that if these were remedied, the evaluand would be excel-
lent. This evaluation involves a conditional prediction, conditional on a proactive response to the evalua-
tion, 
